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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
THE MAIN PARKING MALL
a Utah corporation,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
vs.
SALT LAKE CITY CORPORATION;
SALT LAKE CITY COMMISSION IN
ITS CAPACITY AS REDEVELOPMENT AGENCY OF SALT LAKE
CITY; and REDEVELOPMENT
AGENCY OF SALT LAKE
Defendants and Respondents.

Case No.
13722

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT
We are compelled because of certain statements
made in the brief of Respondents to file this reply
brief.
The Respondents have included in their brief
under the title "statement of facts" certain factual
statements which are not in the record on appeal;
neither were the same ever disclosed or brought to
the attention of the trial court or this Appellant at
the hearing on this matter.
The Respondents on page 3 of their brief refer
to the property, taken by threat of condemnation,
which was held by a number of owners, including
this Appellant The Main Parking Mall. The property
1
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

in question obtained from the Appellant The Main
Parking Mall bordered on the rear of the retail stores
fronting on Main Street between Second and Third
South and was used for parking and entrance to the
rear of the retail establishments, this parking area
becoming a part of the redevelopment project area
designated Central Business District West (CBD
West).
The statement of facts set forth in Respondents'
brief, and which are not a part of the record on
appeal, and which were never disclosed or brought
to the attention of the trial court, appear on pages 3
and 4 of Respondents' brief and we quote the same
for the convenience of this Court:
"The purpose of the program under
which the property was acquired is to remove blight. After blighted land has been
acquired and cleared by the Agency, the land
is made available for sale to private redevelopers at a price not less than the value of its
reuse appraisal. A reuse appraisal is related
to a particular proposed development and cannot be made until the nature and scope of the
proposed development is determined.
"Primary considerations in the disposition process are: (1) nature, quality and
design of the proposed improvements, (2)
financial ability of the private redeveloper to
complete proposed improvements, and (3)
demonstrated experience or ability of the private redevelopers to achieve the proposed
results/'
2
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We quote the following from page 5 of Respondents'brief:
« * * * The governing board of the Redevelopment Agency, in proper exercise of its
discretion, thereupon determined that only
one of the four proposals, (that submitted by
Hartnett-Shaw Development Company, Inc.)
met the requirements which had been established. The Hartnett-Shaw proposal was for a
$40 million development containing an 18story Sheraton Hotel and a large office building." (Emphasis ours)
It will be noted that in the transcript of the
record on appeal there is no reference to the pages
on which these statements appear.
We must confess, however, that the inclusion
of these statements by the Respondents definitely
and conclusively demonstrate that there is a question
of fact not resolved; that one of the main issues as
raised by plaintiffs' complaint is the fact that the
procedures required to be followed by Respondents
were not complied with. The aforementioned statements improperly included in this appeal claimed to
have been followed by Respondents were not followed
as alleged in plaintiff's complaint.
For illustration, Exhibit F, as it is termed (R.
228-231), was an agreement executed by Respondent
Redevelopmnt Agency of Salt Lake City and the developer Hartnett-Shaw Development Company, Inc.,
which provides in paragraph 4, among other things,
as follows:
3
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4. The purchase price of the subject
property shall be determined by negotiation,
but in no event shall be in excess of a range
from $7.00 to $11.00 per square foot, but may
be less than $7.00 per square foot. (R. 229)
This paragraph of the agreement is diametrically opposed to the statement included in the Respondents' brief at pages 3 and 4, that the land would
be made available for sale to private redevelopers at
a price not less than the value of its reuse appraisal.
There is no evidence in the record on appeal, nor
was there at the trial, any disclosure of a reuse
appraisal; Appellant knows of none.
Therefore, paragraph 4 of Exhibit F (R. 229)
as quoted herein is diametrically opposed to the purpose of the program as outlined by the Respondents
in their brief, which they say would be made available for sale to private redevelopers at a price not
less than the value of its reuse appraisal.
Paragraph 4 definitely states that the purchase
price of the property shall in no event be in excess
of a range from $7.00 to $11.00 per square foot, but
may be less than $7.00 per square foot. A genuine
issue of fact occurs, as in the amended complaint
of plaintiff it alleges that the agreement to purchase
as set forth in Exhibit F, paragraph 4 thereof, is
below the market value and contrary to Article I,
Section 105 (E) of the Neighborhood Development
Program Master Agreements between the Respondents and HUD, which were previously entered into
between Respondents and HUD (R. 76).
4
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We refer this Honorable Court to the affidavit
of Danny Wall, executive director of the Respondent,
paragraph 4 thereof (R. 195), in which he states
under oath as follows:
"4. I am aware of rules and regulations
issued by the Department of Housing and
Urban Development prescribng procedures
to be followed in developing the subject parcel of land, and I believe that all applicable
provisions and requirements have been fairly
followed and met by defendants."
This is an absolute admission that they are required to follow the applicable provison requirements
of HUD, and he further states that he believes that
they have fairly followed and met the requirements.
The issue raised by the complaint of the Appellant
is that they have not met the requirements of the
Department of Housing and Urban Development
(HUD), which is required not only by contract but
by statute, section 11-19-3.
On page 5 of their brief the Respondents stated
that the Redevelopment Agency, in the proper exercise of its discretion, determined that only one of the
four proposals (that submitted by Hartnett-Shaw
Development Company, Inc.) met the requirements
which had been established. There is nothing in the
record, nor does the Appellant know of anything;
that is, any requirements that had been established.
This is another issue of fact.
The Respondents improperly have incorporated
in their brief to this Court matters which are not in
5
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the record, to the knowledge of the Appellant, and
are asking this Court to consider them in making its
determination of this appeal, as proven uncontradicted facts.
The statute, section 11-19-3, is very clear that
the Redevelopment Agency, Respondent herein, may
borrow money or accept financial or other assistance
from the state or federal government for any redevelopment project within [its area of] operation
and comply with any conditions of such loan or
grant. (Emphasis added)
The issue as raised by the complaint of the
Appellant is that the Respondents have not complied with the conditions of the loan, and that by
Section 11-19-3 Utah Code Annotated it must do so.
We quote verbatum from the statute for the convenience of this Court:
"11-19-3. Designation of redevelopment
agency — powers and duties. — Each community by enactment of an ordinance by its
legislative body may designate the legislative
body of the community as the redevelopment
agency of such community, which agency shall
be authorized to enter into contracts generally
and shall have power to transact the business
and exercise all the powers provided for in
this act. The agency may accept financial or
other assistance from any public or private
source for the agency's activities, powers, and
duties, and expend any funds so received for
any of the purposes of this act. The agency
may borrow money or acceptfinancialor other
assistance from the state or the federal gov6
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ernment for any redevelopment project within
[its area of] operation and comply with any
conditions of such loan or grant."
It is ridiculous to assume, as Respondents claim,
that compliance with any loan conditions is purely
permissive.
In other words, they don't have to comply with
any conditions of the loan imposed by the federal
agency or the lender. This is ridiculous.
We again refer to paragraph 4 of the statement
of the executive director of the Respondent Redevelopment Agency of Salt Lake City (R. 195), under
oath, that he is aware of the rules and regulations
issued by the Department of Housing and Urban
Development (HUD) prescribing procedures to be
followed in developing the subject parcel of land,
and that he believed that all applicable provisions
and requirements had been fairly followed and met
by defendants (Respondents).
This Appellant in making its bid in conjunction
with three others certainly had the right to assume
that the statute, rules and regulations would be complied with; and that the request for bids by the Respondents included the representation that they
would comply with the conditions of the rules and
regulations of Department of Housing and Urban
Development (HUD) and the statute, section 1119-3, and that Appellant as a bidder would be
required in its bid to also comply with those conditions.

7
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The statement that the only remedy that the
Appellant has is against the lender for its failure
to enforce conditions of the loan is ridiculous and
ludicrous.
Respondents' statement on page 8, "If a third
party has any justiciable interest under such circumstances, it could only be against the lender for
failure to enforce the conditions of such loan or
grant, or against the state of Utah for failure to
permit proper compliance by the borrower (Respondent)." This just has no substance in law or in
reason.
Exhibit F, paragraph 4 thereof (R. 228-331)
is only one example of what appellant alleges constitutes non-compliance of Section 11-19-3, and the
conditons of the loan made by the lender and referred to by the executive director Danny Wall (R.
195). As set forth in Appellant's brief on page 6, the
Respondents are required to adopt a resolution which
provides among other things as follows :
"(c) Approve the price, or minimum
price, and determine that such price is not less
than fair value." (R. 216)
This Honorable Court is well aware that under
Rule 56 of Utah Rules of Civil Procedure that the
moving party, and in this case the Respondents, is
asserting that on the basis of record as it then exists,
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact
and that it is entitled to a judgment as a matter of
law. Durham v. Mason & Dixon Lines, Inc., 404 F.2d
864, certiorari denied 89 S.Ct. 1594, 394 U.S. 998,
22 L.Ed 2d 776.
8
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We feel that the United States Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit, has aptly stated the interpretation of Rule 56 in the case of James v. Atchison,
Topeka and Santa Fe Railway Co., 464 F.2d 173
(1972), in which it makes the following statement:
« * * * JJ. -g axiomatic, for example,
that the moving party must demonstrate entitlement beyond reasonable doubt and that
the courts, trial and appellate, must consider
factual inferences tending to show triable issues in a light favorable to existence of such
issues. See 6 Moore's Federal Practice §§
56.15(1), (3), (8), 56.27(1); Avrick v.
Rockmont Envelope Co., 155 F.2d 568, 9 F.R.
Serv. 56c. 41, Case 7 (10th Cir. 1946;) Broderick Wood Products Co. v. United States, 195
F.2d 433 (10th Cir. 1952); Clausen & Sons
v. Theo Hamm Brewing Co., 395 F.2d 388
(8th Cir. 1968). Thus, if there is an inference
which can be deduced from the facts whereby
decedent might recover, summary judgment is
inappropriate."
These federal cases interpreting Federal Rule
56 are in accord with Utah interpretation of Rule
56 under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. In
Welchman v. Wood, 9 Utah 2d 25, 337 P.2d 410
(1959), the Utah Supreme Court said that "summary judgment is a drastic remedy and the courts
should be reluctant to deprive litigants of an opportunity to fully present their contentions upon a
trial." Id. at 411. Also in Housley v. Anaconda Company, 19 Utah 2d 124, 427 P.2d 390 (1967) the court
reaffirmed this position by saying:
"Prior decisions point out that summary
9
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judgment is a drastic remedy and should be
granted with reluctance. (Citations omitted).
The plaintiffs should be granted the opportunity of producing whatever evidence they wish,
. . . " Id. at 393.
SUMMARY
The Appellant is simply asking for its day in
court. The questions of fact and law presented in
this case are much too important to be summarily
dismissed, or to be dismissed without affording Appellant an opportunity to present its evidence.
The issue is whether or not the Respondents
have abided by the Utah law. The Appellant was an
invited bidder, invited by the Respondents, and is
entitled to have the law complied with. The Appellant in substance has alleged that Respondents have
not complied with the law of Utah by which it was
created, and its powers given. The Respondents claim
they have complied. There is no federal law involved.
There are, however, several material and important
factual issues which have not been settled and cannot be settled without a trial on the merits of this
case.
The District Court in and for Salt Lake County
has jurisdiction of this matter and is the proper
forum in which Appellant's case should be tried.
Respectfully submitted,
CALLISTER, GREEN & NEBEKER
By Louis H. Callister, Sr.
W. Clark Burt
Attorneys for Appellant
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